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Abstract 
Environmental challenges are, at their root, social problems that arise from income and power 
inequality.  Thus, inequality is an environmental issue just as environmental degradation is a 
social issue (forming a “social-ecological nexus”), and solutions must address them jointly 
through principles and institutions rooted in justice. This article develops a two-sided “social-
ecological” approach to offer both analytical and empirical insights into the dynamics of this 
relationship and a policy path forward. 
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1. A Social-Ecological Approach 
We are facing a paradox of environmental emergency: over the past decade, as global 
environmental problems such as climate change have grown more daunting and tangible, the 
ability of institutions and organizations to rise to the challenge has seemingly diminished. 
How to make sense of the fact that the more we know, the less we act? 
First, the environmental movement has not yet succeeded at articulating a vision of human 
well-being and environmental resilience that embeds ecological challenges in tangible social 
realities. Because of this failure, it now faces the risk of being reduced to what John Maynard 
Keynes called in a different context a “party of catastrophe,” disseminating unbearable 
anxiety without offering solutions deemed feasible by a majority of citizens.  
Second, amidst the “great recession” in Europe and the US, anemic economic recovery, 
sluggish job creation, and widening social inequality have conspired to minimize and even 
marginalize “long-term” environmental preoccupations in the face of “urgent” social needs. 
This “de-prioritization” of environmental policy is often justified on the side of policy-makers 
by the poor state of public finance and the need for fiscal austerity, but citizens themselves 
seem to succumb to short-termism: recent opinion surveys in the US and the European Union 
have revealed a public increasingly willing to sacrifice environmental protection for economic 
growth.i  
To address such challenges with the comprehensiveness and urgency required, we must 
acknowledge the interrelatedness of social and environmental problems. Environmental 
challenges are, at their root, social problems that arise from income and power inequality.  
Thus, inequality is an environmental issue just as environmental degradation is a social issue, 
and solutions must address them jointly through principles and institutions rooted in justice. A 
“social-ecological” approach can offer both analytical and empirical insights into the 
dynamics of this relationship and a path forward.ii  
On the analytical level, the social sciences hold the key to the solution of the severe 
environmental problems that “hard” sciences have revealed over the last three decades. The 
power of social cooperation has enabled humans to dominate earth systems, and humans will 
need to harness that same power of cooperation responsibly to guarantee the planet’s 
continued hospitality. The issue at stake, it should be noted, is not to “save the planet” but to 
save the planet’s hospitality for humans and to preserve the most vulnerable among us from 
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the severe consequences of our collective inconsequence. But we lack the social-ecological 
knowledge needed to help citizens learn how to reform the social systems that frame human 
attitudes and behaviors so that they can preserve their natural life support systems. 
The social-ecological approach (Laurent 2011a; 2011b; 2012; 2014) is aimed at addressing 
this knowledge gap by considering the reciprocal relationship between social and 
environmental issues, demonstrating how social logics determine environmental damage and 
crises and exploring the reciprocal relation i.e. the consequences of these damages on social 
inequality.  
The first arrow of causality, that runs from inequality to environmental degradation, can be 
labelled ‘integrative social-ecology’, as it shows that the gap between the rich and the poor 
and the interaction of the two groups leads to the worsening of environmental degradations 
and ecological crises that affect every member of a given community (the scale of the 
community can vary from local to global). The reciprocal arrow of causality that goes from 
ecological crises to social injustice can be labelled ‘differential social-ecology’, as it shows 
that the social impact of ecological crises is not the same for different individuals and groups, 
given their socio-economic status. 
Environmental risk is certainly a collective and global horizon but it is socially differentiated. 
Who is responsible for what and with what consequences for whom? Such is the two-sided 
social-ecological question. 
On the empirical level, the social-ecological approach reveals the existence of a strong, 
reciprocal, and complex relationship between social justice and ecology. On one hand, social 
inequalities drive ecological crises. They increase the ecological irresponsibility of the richest 
in society and among nations. Moreover, such inequalities fuel the demand for economic 
growth among the rest of the population, increase social vulnerability, lower environmental 
sensitivity, and hinder collective action. On the other hand, ecological crises create new forms 
of inequality. Structural “environmental inequalities” are rising in developed countries and 
developing countries alike, creating feedback loops of environmental and social degradation. 
Similarly, “social-ecological” disasters, like the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina in 
2005 or Typhoon Haiyan in November 2013, are anything but natural: their causes are more 
and more human, and their impacts are determined by social factors like economic 
development, inequality, and democracy.  
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Sustainable development assembles three dimensions: economic, social and ecological. While the 
economic-social and economic-ecological links have been explored in great detail in recent years 
(resulting in, respectively, the “inclusive development” and “green economy” paradigms, see 
figure 1), the social-ecological link is more obscure. This paper intends on shedding some light on 
this missing link in sustainable development. 
 
Figure 1: the three linkages of sustainable development 
 
Before doing so, we should acknowledge that some international institutions have tried to bring 
the issue at the forefront of the global agenda, most notably the Human Development Report 
Office of the United Nations and the IPCC. In 2011, the former released “Sustainability and 
Equity: A Better Future for All”, arguing that “the urgent global challenges of sustainability and 
equity must be addressed together – and identifies policies on the national and global level that 
could spur mutually reinforcing progress towards these interlinked goals.” The link between 
equity and sustainability has also emerged in the third installment of the AR5 IPCC Report. In a 
book-long chapter, the authors note with “high confidence” that “equity is an integral part of 
sustainable development”. More specifically, they argue that three dimensions should be 
considered in both mitigation and adaptation climate policy: “a moral justification that draws 
upon ethical principles; a legal justification that appeals to existing treaty commitments and soft 
law agreements to cooperate on the basis of stated equity principles; and an effectiveness 
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justification that argues that a fair arrangement is more likely to be agreed internationally and 
successfully implemented domestically”. The research on the critical, reciprocal and complex link 
between social inequality and ecological crises and degradations - the social-ecological nexus - is 
spreading. 
2. How Inequality Pollutes Our Planet 
While there are many good reasons for strengthening democracy against the corroding force 
of inequality, the environmental one may be as fundamental as it is overlooked. Opponents of 
such a case for environmental action either deny the existence and severity of the inequality 
crisis or assert that the reduction of inequality would, in fact, worsen environmental crises. 
Whereas the first argument can be readily disproven, the latter merits more attention.  
Research on inequality indeed dismisses the first counterargument.iii In the 1990s and 2000s, 
“global inequality,” or inequality between world citizens (the sum of international income 
inequality weighted by demography and intra-national inequality), began to decrease for the 
first time in a century; however, the decline of poverty in China accounts for most of this 
decline.iv In fact, if one excludes China and its demographic weight, then international 
inequality has sharply increased in the last two decades. Moreover, innumerable studies and 
reports for developed and developing countries alike have attested to the growth of intra-
national inequality in the last thirty years (see among others Atkinson and Piketty 2010, 
Atkinson, Piketty and Saez, 2011 and OECD, 2011).  
What about the second argument? Because environmental damage results from the progress 
towards development, some in fact argue that eradication of poverty, rather than poverty 
itself, is the major obstacle to sustainability. There is, in economic terms, an apparent trade-
off: the decline of poverty, along with the general improvement of the human lot, comes at the 
cost of the destruction and degradation of ecosystems and biodiversity. This trend prevailed 
throughout much of the 20th century. As human development indicators have increased, 
global biodiversity has declined. For instance, from 1970 to 2010, the Human Development 
Index improved on average by about 40%, while the global biodiversity index fell by 30% to 
50% (HDRO, 2010 and WWF, 2012 and 2014).  
Such a perspective, however, ignores the micro-ecological and macro-ecological dimensions 
of rising inequality. Let’s first consider the micro-ecological level, i.e. the behavior of rich 
and poor in isolation. With respect to the rich, Thorstein Veblen showed that the middle class’ 
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desire to imitate the lifestyles of the upper class can lead to a cultural epidemic of 
environmental degradation. Veblen called this phenomenon “conspicuous consumption,” and 
the bigger cars, larger houses, more luxurious goods, etc., that the rich buy and the middle 
class desire have a heavy environmental toll. With regard to the poor, Indira Gandhi explained 
in her speech at the first international environmental summit in Stockholm in 1972 that 
“poverty and need are the biggest polluters.” In the developing world, poverty is indeed 
leading to unsustainable environmental degradation, such as the dramatic depletion of forest 
cover in Haiti or Madagascar, the product of a losing trade-off between present and future 
welfare.v Since the wealth of the world’s poor lies in natural capital, because of lack of access 
to other forms of capital, the depletion of such natural resources leads to further 
impoverishment. The eradication of poverty, thus, is not only a social cause but also an 
environmental one, provided that it takes the form not of a game of consumerist catch-up, but 
of a redefinition of comprehensive wealth, its components, and its indicators.vi   
On the macro-ecological level - where the interaction of rich and poor and its environmental 
outcome is considered - it can be shown that a political economy lies behind environmental 
degradation (Boyce, 2002 and 2013). Without winners (those who derive a net benefit), 
environmental degradation would not occur, but without losers (those who bear net costs), 
such degradation would not be a question of well-being. The winners are able to impose the 
costs of environmental degradation onto the losers because the losers are either not yet born, 
ignorant of the consequences of the degradation, or lacking in the power to limit them. Five 
macro-ecological channels though which rich and poor interact in environmental 
degradations, crises, and policies stand out in particular.   
1) Inequality increases the need for environmentally harmful and socially unnecessary 
economic growth. 
Inequality inflates the need for economic growth. If wealth accumulation in a given country is 
increasingly captured by a small fraction of the population, the rest of the population will 
need to compensate with additional economic development. Paul Krugman summed this up 
well: “Here's a radical thought: if the rich get more, that leaves less for everyone else.”vii 
Since virtually no country in the world has managed to decouple (in absolute or net terms) 
economic growth from its negative environmental impact, e.g., carbon emissions or waste, 
more economic growth currently means more of such “bads,” whether locally or globally.viii 
In the United States, between 1993 and 2011, one percent of the population managed to 
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capture seventy-five percent of economic growth. A more even distribution of income (i.e. a 
growth of income of 2% for the top 10% and bottom 90% of the income distribution alike) 
would have reduced the total growth necessary to meet the needs of the vast majority of 
Americans and led to a small decline in CO2 emissions (author’s calculation based on Piketty 
and Saez, 2013). 
But the equalization of economic conditions could, in fact, increase the ecological challenge 
since the marginal increase of environmental degradation is higher at the bottom of the 
income distribution than at the top. However, such conclusions assume that the reduction of 
inequality would entail spreading the lifestyles, wasteful consumption, and ecological 
footprint of the richest. If so, then the ecological pressure would indeed become unbearable: 
ecological footprint data clearly show that high income countries drive the global “ecological 
deficit”. But an alternative view holds that shifting from captured development to shared 
development while redefining development itself can in fact create the necessary room for 
sustainable social progress. 
2) Inequality increases the ecological irresponsibility of the richest, within each country and 
among nations. 
Widening inequality exacerbates the fundamental tendency of capitalist enterprises to 
maximize profits by externalizing cost and turning socially deprived areas into “pollution 
havens” within countries and across their borders. The financialization of the economy over 
the past three decades has exacerbated this tendency by shortening time horizons and 
increasing indifference to unsustainable natural assets management. As the gap between rich 
and poor grows, governments and businesses find it easier to transfer the environmental 
damage of the activities of the rich to the neighborhoods of the poor. Income and power 
inequality, that tends to dissociate polluters from payers, thus act as a disincentive for 
ecological responsibility or as an accelerator of ecological irresponsibility.  
On the consumption side, the richest consumers present a paradox. They declare in surveys 
that they care more about the environment than the poor do, and they are indeed, according to 
the same surveys, more likely to adopt the best environmental practices or to favor more 
ambitious environmental policy (see OECD, 2008). However, at the same time, they pollute 
more than the poor in volume because of their higher incomes and more expensive lifestyles. 
They are also more able to protect themselves from the negative impacts of their behavior as 
they become richer.  
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Widening inequality therefore increases not only the demand for a better environment among 
the richest but also their ability to acquire this good at a lower cost by transferring all 
corresponding environmental damages to the poorest. For example, in Spain, water has 
increasingly been diverted from small agricultural enterprises to large coastal tourist facilities. 
Wealthy tourists enjoy water as a natural amenity and are able to transfer the cost of its 
abduction and stress to growingly impoverished farmers who now face structural droughts.  
On the production side, a company faces two essential options to reduce the environmental 
cost of its production. On the one hand, it can try to adopt the best available technology and to 
reduce the environmentally harmful impact of its production, a decision that can entail a high 
economic cost in the short run. On the other hand, it can seek to minimize the economic cost 
of the social compensation public authorities might demand from it. Income and power 
inequality will lead the company to relocate to a socially deprived area where people have low 
incomes and weak political mobilization capacities. The residents of that area would be, 
presumably, less willing to pay for environmental quality and therefore would demand lesser 
compensation for environmental damage. Likewise, the feeble political capability of the 
residents would limit the risk of the emergence of collective action to resist the damaging 
production (see infra about the effect of inequality on collective action capability).  
These dynamics also apply internationally and explain why inequality between countries can 
result in tragic but avoidable environmental disasters like the chemical pollution in Bhopal in 
December 1984 or the current degradation of the Niger Delta. Climate change is another case 
in point: Western societies are less likely to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions because 
they have little economic incentives to do so as long as they are able to adapt to the most 
devastating effects of climate change. The reverse is of course true for low-income countries, 
which contribute little to global emissions but will pay the highest human price for the coming 
destructive climate. The most striking example of this global injustice may be Africa. The 
continent accounts for less than 3% of global emissions, but water stress in Africa due to 
climate change could threaten the well-being of up to 600 million people in the coming 
decades.  
These mechanisms could also account for the striking disparity in biodiversity preservation 
around the world, as measured by the World Wildlife Fund’s Living Planet Index.ix The index 
has fallen by about 30% globally in the last four decades (new methodology concludes that 
the fall was of the order of 50%), but the decline has been uneven. From 1990 to 2008, the 
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index increased in developed countries by 7%, but it plummeted by 31% in middle-income 
countries and by 60% in low-income countries. According to the WWF, geographic factors 
explain only a fraction of the difference. International inequality likely plays an important 
role, for richer countries are able to preserve their biodiversity while simultaneously 
exploiting that of countries rich in natural capital but poor in income. For this very reason, 
evaluations of the ecological impact of a region like the EU, which imports much of its energy 
and raw materials, should take into account the damage done outside the region, in the 
original source of production and extraction. x 
3) Inequality, which affects the health of individuals and groups, diminishes the social-
ecological resilience of communities and societies and weakens their collective ability to 
adapt to accelerating environmental change. 
A substantial body of research, initiated by Richard Wilkinson and Michael Marmot, has 
confirmed the negative impact of social inequality on physical and mental health at the local 
and national level.xi Inequality also acts as an underlying driver of many diseases perceived as 
natural or biological in the developing world. Paul Farmer, for instance, has asserted that 
“inequality itself constitutes our modern plague.”xii Myriad governmental and international 
institutions have already begun to embrace this avenue of research in crafting policy agendas 
(the WHO to name only one).  
In parallel, the concepts of social (and even social-ecological) resilience and vulnerability are 
now common in the discourse of environmental science. Environmental scientists have begun 
to describe vulnerability to “natural” disasters as a function of exposure and sensitivity to a 
given shock, on the one hand, and adaptive capacity and resilience, on the other. Considered 
within this framework, inequality increases exposure and sensitivity and weakens adaptive 
capacity and resilience: it acts as a multiplier of the social damage caused by environmental 
shocks for developed and developing countries alike.  
4) Inequality hinders collective action aimed at preserving natural resources 
According to the “logic of collective action” (the classic theoretical framework formulated in 
Olson, 1965), a small group of wealthy individuals, convinced that they are the ones who will 
receive the greatest benefit from environmental protection, would be ready to pay the high 
cost of ambitious environmental policies. The few (richest), the argument goes, have a logistic 
comparative advantage over the many (poor). Accordingly, a larger group of people, with 
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more heterogeneous revenues, would not be able to find ways to effectively organize to 
protect the environment. 
This line of reasoning, which suggests that inequality is actually favorable to the preservation 
of natural resources, has been proven wrong both theoretically and empirically.xiii A number 
of studies have shown that inequality is, in fact, adverse to the sustainable management of 
common resources as it disrupts, demoralizes, and disorganizes human communities.xiv The 
work of the late Elinor Ostrom in particular demonstrated that institutions that allow 
communities to preserve resources essential to their long-term well-being are based on 
principles of reciprocity and fairness, the very opposite of inequality. Her critics however 
make one important point: the difficulty of extrapolating from a purely local context. 
In order to account for scale, an analysis of the negative impacts of inequality on 
environmental decision-making must look toward national and international examples as well. 
The contemporary United States provides a useful illustration in this respect. Since the 1980s, 
the US has retreated from the ecological world stage, gradually transferring its prior role of 
global environmental leader to the European Union. Rapidly increasing income inequality and 
the corresponding political repercussions might provide an illuminating explanation for this 
turn of events.  
Environmental policy-making requires a broad consensus transcending party boundaries, and 
the simultaneous rise of income inequality and political polarization (understood as growing 
distance between parties) has reduced the possibility of such bipartisan cooperation. It is now 
almost impossible in the US to enact ambitious legislation of the caliber of that passed in the 
1970s, which later became a model for other nations. While the EPA was formed in 1970, at 
the beginning of the golden decade for environmental legislation, it is now much more 
difficult even to confirm a director for the agency. The EPA is also, internally, the subject of 
political pressure motivated by industrial lobbying, especially from fossil fuels companies that 
have been empowered by growing economic inequality. 
As studies have identified a correlation between income inequality and political polarization 
in the US, we can think of environmental policy as one of the many policy casualties of the 
“dance” between these two trends.xv Political polarization and economic inequality both 
deepened over the past decade. Correspondingly, inertia in the face of environmental 
degradation has worsened, with the devastation of the Appalachian region and the sabotage of 
climate negotiations. In this latter case, as with other domestic and global environmental 
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challenges, polarization is combined with an overall shift to the right of the political spectrum, 
so that the status quo caused by polarization results in a more pro-business and anti-
environmental policy. 
This polarization dynamic at the local and national level replicates itself on the global scene. 
Recent research, for instance, has shown that “support is higher for global climate agreements 
that distribute costs according to prominent fairness principles.”xvi Equality and fairness 
among parties to international environmental negotiations appears to be a key feature of 
successful global ecological governance (like the Montreal Protocol on ozone layer depleting 
substances). On the contrary, inequality in the negotiation process (procedural inequality) 
and/or distribution of costs (distributive inequality) among Nation States can alter the 
progress of ecological sovereignty pooling, as with UNFCCC conferences. 
Finally, recent research (Motesharrei et al, 2014) goes a step further by arguing that inequality 
could play a key role in bringing about a global ecological collapse. The study investigates the 
possibility of civilizational collapse, drawing on a rich literature and relying on a new model 
named “HANDY” ('Human And Nature Dynamical) which particularity is to add to already 
existing features of earth models a social stratification variable. Humans, in the model, are 
divided between “Elites” and “Commoners” and their consumption of natural resources is 
differentiated according to their economic and political power. 
The model’s key insight is that ecological collapse can not only come about because of “the 
stretching of resources due to the strain placed on the ecological carrying capacity” but also 
due to “the economic stratification of society into Elites [rich] and Masses (or "Commoners") 
[poor]”. The grim conclusion of the authors regarding one of their key scenarios goes as 
follows: “the Elites eventually consume too much, resulting in a famine among Commoners 
that eventually causes the collapse of society”. Yet, the study also shows that this seemingly 
irresistible collapse by inequality can be prevented through a reduction of current levels of 
social stratification, a more equal distribution in the consumption of natural resources and a 
higher efficiency in this consumption (although technological progress alone can not, in the 
model, prevent the collapse). 
5) Inequality reduces the political acceptability of environmental preoccupations and the 
ability to offset the potential socially regressive effects of environmental policies 
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Surveys on the political economy of environmental policies have shown that people generally 
view such policies as socially regressive, which they can, in fact, be.
xviii
xvii Growing relative and 
absolute inequality can thus translate into a reduced acceptability of short-term social (real or 
perceived) “sacrifices” for long-term (social-ecological) benefits. The failure of France to 
adopt a carbon tax in 2009/2010 illustrates this argument.  The socially regressive effect of 
the tax was obvious, as the bottom 20% of French households spend 2.5 times as much of 
their income on energy as the top 20% of households do (Laurent, 2011). Unsurprisingly, 
polls reported that as much as 66% of the French population opposed the carbon tax, mostly 
on economic grounds, with a sharp division between lower-income and higher-income social 
categories. The government eventually decided to abandon the project in March 2010 after a 
grueling political defeat amidst rising unemployment and poverty in the context of the “great 
recession”.  
The public budget constraints produced by growing inequality, which translates at the 
macroeconomic level into lower aggregate demand and lower tax revenues (Stiglitz, 2012) 
further exacerbate the problem of political acceptability. Inequality makes it more complex 
and costly, if not impossible, to implement effective compensation mechanisms to counteract 
possible regressive effects of certain environmental policies, because there are too many 
people to compensate with too little resource (Nordic countries have been able to successfully 
implement carbon taxation precisely because they have very low income inequality levels, 
dynamic economies, and efficient welfare states which foster social consensus). However, 
social compensation for policies like carbon taxes is a key factor to their political 
acceptability and even their economic efficiency. In fact, all countries and localities that have 
adopted carbon taxes over the last two decades have also adopted compensation mechanisms 
for households and firms which overcame the initial resistance from citizens and businesses. 
Such mechanisms explain why Sweden was able to implement and maintain a carbon tax in 
the 1990s and the 2000s, with a rate that now exceeds 100 euros per ton of CO2.  
3. How Environmental Devastation Degrades Our Society   
While the impact of inequality on environmental crises that has been detailed in the previous 
section may be harder to grasp, the reverse relation is easier to understand and to explain. 
Environmental conditions determine well-being, most prominently through health-related 
factors. Therefore, environmental degradation leads to significant and socially differentiated 
well-being impact. Environmental justice scholars and activists have indeed shown that a 
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public policy arsenal or a welfare state aiming at social fairness that fails to account for 
environmental conditions will ultimately fail.  
 
1) The four forms of environmental inequality   
 
As contemporary ecological crises worsen, the threat to social justice posed by environmental 
inequalities rises simultaneously. One can think of four types of environmental inequality: 
 
- Environmental inequality in exposure and access, resulting from the unequal 
distribution of environmental quality between individuals and groups. Exposure to 
environmental nuisances, risks, and hazard, on one hand, should be distinguished from 
inequality in access to environmental amenities, such as green spaces but also energy. 
Fuel poverty, which is the outcome of unequal social access to energy, is becoming a 
considerable social problem in a number of European countries. In the UK, estimates 
show that fuel poor households have tripled since 2003 and in 2011 affected close to 
15% of the population.xix  
 
- Environmental inequality regarding the effects of public policy arises when the impact 
of environmental policies are unevenly distributed among individuals and social 
groups. For instance, energy taxation could end up disproportionately burdening those 
on the lower side of the income spectrum.  
 
- Environmental inequality with respect to involvement in policy-making means that 
individuals and groups with more resources have more access to environmental 
policymaking on a local, national, or global level.  
 
- Finally, the lifestyles of different individuals and social groups have unequal 
environmental impacts.xx  
 
These various environmental inequalities (for a study of environmental inequalities in France, 
see Laurent 2014b) can morph into persistent social inequalities through institutions or natural 
disasters, two points to which we now successively turn.  
 
2) The feedback loop of environmental and social injustice  
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Environmental inequalities can produce lasting and severe damage on the socially 
disadvantaged, perpetuating and exacerbating injustice. Studies on the effects of air pollution 
in Los Angeles have shown how exposure to atmospheric pollution affects school 
performance through the impact of respiratory diseases developed by exposed children.xxi It 
has been also shown that children from poor families are more likely to be born with poor 
health because of the polluted environment experienced by their mothers during pregnancy 
(Currie, 2011). This, in turn, results in poor educational attainment and eventually lower 
income and lower social status.  
As Janet Currie eloquently remarks and convincingly documents, a feedback loop of injustice 
thus arises between environmental inequalities and social inequalities fueled by “mechanisms 
underlying the perpetuation of lower socioeconomic status”: “Poor and minority children are 
more likely to be in poor health at birth, partly because their mothers are less able to provide a 
healthy fetal environment. Poor health at birth is associated with poorer adult outcomes, 
which in turn provide less than optimal conditions for the children of the poor.” 
 
3) The human origins of “natural” disasters  
 
How much do social factors on the one hand and fate on the other determine the human 
impact of “natural disasters”? This question was on philosophers’ minds as early as the mid-
18th century. In the aftermath of the 1755 Lisbon earthquake, French philosophers Jean-
Jacques Rousseau and Voltaire started a fiery and eventually bitter argument over whom or 
what was to be held responsible for the disaster, which had killed close to a hundred thousand 
people. Voltaire blamed divine providence while Rousseau blamed humans, responsible for 
their concentration in cities prone to disaster. Interestingly enough, the Lisbon earthquake is 
credited with triggering modern seismology study. 
 
Current developments give increasing weight to Rousseau’s view: social factors do play a 
crucial role in so-called “natural” disasters, which are more appropriately “social-ecological.” 
Their causes and impacts are more and more the results of actions taken by human societies, 
with earthquakes as a particularly striking example: countries like Japan have learned 
throughout the 20th century to literally immune themselves from earthquakes’ human impact, 
but not all countries have had the means to do so, an obvious observation when one considers 
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the consequence of the two similarly powerful earthquakes that devastated Haiti in 2010 and 
barely affected Japan in 2011. The social nature of “natural” disasters is also on clear display 
when one considers the socially (and racially) differentiated toll of the heat wave that struck 
Chicago in 1995 and Paris in 2003 (see Laurent, 2010) or the hurricane that hit New Orleans 
in 2005.  
 
One can thus make two points that both call for action: human impact exacerbates natural 
disasters and makes some of them more frequent; much of the damage from all natural 
disasters occurs because of insufficient and unsustainable planning and a lack of foresight 
(e.g. the devastation associated with Typhoon Hayian in November 2013). Local and national 
policymakers must thus anticipate announced and virtually certain future disasters - especially 
heat waves and floods in rich countries and severe hurricanes in poor countries - if they wish 
to spare their citizens implacable future injustice.  
 
In particular, the role played by structural environmental inequalities but also the lack of 
social capital in certain communities exposed to social-ecological disasters such as heat waves 
or hurricanes warrants deeper analysis. For example, minorities face more exposure to the 
risks connected to urban heat island effect because their neighborhoods often lack tree cover 
or contain too much impervious surfaces, such as asphalt and concrete.xxii  
 
To address both the role of inequality in environmental crises and the social impact of 
environmental degradation, a true social-ecological approach to public policy is needed. 
 
4. Re-designing the welfare state on a social-ecological foundation 
The welfare state, founded in the 1880s in unified Germany, is based on the idea that humans 
have the right to be protected from the vagaries of Nature and social life. The “social security” 
currently guaranteed to less than 30% of the world population by national welfare states is a 
considerable extension of the civil security that Hobbes entrusted the Leviathan with in the 
mid-1600s. The next step consists in moving from social security toward social-ecological 
security by recognizing that the nature of human welfare and social risk has changed at the 
end of the 20th century: because of worsening ecological crises, environmental conditions will 
play an ever-increasing role both in risk and welfare, while our environmental crises are 
evolving from a logic of uncertainty to a logic of risk, calling for insurance. 
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In this respect, there is no fundamental difference between social and environmental policy: 
both aim at correcting market economy failures such as imperfect information, incomplete 
markets, externalities, etc. that justify public intervention (Laurent, 2014a). As a matter of 
fact, climate change has been called the “the biggest market failure the world has seen” 
(Stern, 2008). A social-ecological state should therefore fulfill the traditional allocation, 
redistribution and stabilization functions provided by a welfare state, but in the environmental 
domain. For example, in allocating resources, policy-makers must acknowledge the current 
social cost of environmental crises (respiratory diseases, cancer, etc.) and anticipate their 
future social cost. The same is true of the redistribution function: resources should be 
redistributed not only on the basis of age, income level or employment status but also on the 
basis of vulnerability of certain communities and/or locations with respect to climate change 
risk. 
But how should we implement such a social-ecological approach and design social-ecological 
policies? A social-ecological approach requires identifying the relations, sometimes 
intractable, that bind social issues and environmental challenges - recognizing the 
environmental dimension of social issues and revealing the social implications of 
environmental challenges. In many cases, there will be trade-offs between environmental and 
social outcomes. However, social-ecological policies must aim at overcoming such trade-offs 
and at achieving better outcomes in both dimensions simultaneously. This is a very important 
point in the current context of economic stagnation where environmental policy is often 
opposed by businesses or citizens on social grounds (environmental rules are often accused in 
the public debate of being “job-killers”). 
One way to represent specific social-ecological trade-offs, and the ways social-ecological 
policies can try to overcome them, is to use a social-ecological matrix (see figure).  
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Social-ecological trade-offs and policies 
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definitions) results both in monetary poverty and energy over-consumption. Thermal 
insulation (home weatherization) allows for a reduction in energy consumption (and thus 
lower related greenhouse gas emissions, triggering environmental improvement), which 
translates into lower expenditure devoted to energy by fuel poor households, allowing for 
social progress. 
 
In the top right quadrant, carbon taxation without social compensation is both socially 
regressive, as it hurts the poorest more because of their higher income share devoted to energy 
consumption, and environmentally efficient, because it reduces greenhouse emissions by 
pricing carbon. Introducing social compensation based on income level but also location 
(rural areas versus urban areas, suburban areas vs. urban centers, etc.) maintains the 
environmental efficiency of the policy measure (compensation should not be understood as 
exoneration), but eases its social impact and therefore its political acceptability.  
 
Finally, the bottom left quadrant takes the example of cost-benefit analysis (CBA) applied to 
infrastructure projects, for instance housing. When biodiversity and ecosystems services 
impacts are not or only partially taken into consideration in CBA, building a residential 
complex on a wetland increases human well-being while at the same time destroying 
ecosystems and biodiversity. The social-ecological policy in this case is conceptual: it consists 
in changing indicators used to decide or not to implement the policy by integrating the social 
value of ecosystems and biodiversity. When a correct assessment based on comprehensive 
wealth analysis including benefits derived from natural capital is carried out, the infrastructure 
project will be moved to a better/less harmful location, resulting in both environmental and 
social progress.  
 
These simple examples show how urban policy, tax policy and accounting policy can be re-
designed to become social-ecological policies, in the context of a social-ecological approach 
reshaping the welfare state. 
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Conclusion: building institutions for the social-ecological transition 
Going back to our starting point, two “operational” considerations seem to be missing from 
the legitimate concern expressed by the environmental community regarding our worsening 
ecological crises.   
The first one is the general notion that transitions don’t “leapfrog” over the dark present to the 
desirable future: they need to rely on institutions to happen. The history of social transitions 
indeed highlights the role of institutions as engines of accepted change. Institutions are the 
central dynamic elements of any human transition because their very purpose is to facilitate 
social cooperation in time. What we have come to call “industrial revolutions” were primarily 
institutional revolutions, from the introduction of stable property rights in the 19th century to 
labor contracts and social protection in the 20th century. Empirical studies confirm that 
beyond geography or trade, institutions are the key drivers of human development and social 
change. Addressing our ecological crises is therefore a problem more practical than moral: 
what kind of institutions do we need to sustain the transition toward a world where our life 
support system is preserved and not systematically destroyed? 
In order to build those institutions, we have to recognize the social dimension of 
environmental challenges and crises and the role inequality plays on both sides of the social-
ecological nexus. Approaching environmental issues along the logic of social justice may 
help, according to the distinction made by Dobson (2003), changing attitudes and not only 
behaviors. This is precisely the second missing operational element, or better yet missing link, 
in the environmental discourse developed in the last four decades or so.  
As this paper has argued, social-ecological policies, forming the core of a new “dynamic 
welfare state” (including sustainability understood as the projection of welfare in time, or 
“dynamic welfare”) might well be the kind of institutions able to combine environmental and 
social progress needed for our century.  
The social-ecological nexus agenda essentially proposes to move away from “environmental 
morality” in order to make progress towards ecological safety: It suggests that ecology as a 
scientific discipline and political movement should not be devoted to blaming humans for 
their insults and injuries to Nature but focus on protecting them from the unfair consequence 
of their improvidence. 
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decoupling”), only relative decoupling remains. 
ix WWF, 2012. 
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xix In the UK, a household is said to be fuel poor if it needs to spend more than 10% of its income on 
fuel to maintain a satisfactory heating regime, usually 21 degrees for the main living area, and 18 
degrees for other occupied rooms. Under a new, alternative, definition, a household is said to be in 
fuel poverty if it “has required fuel costs that are above average (the national median level) and if, 
were they spend to that amount, they would be left with a residual income below the official poverty 
line” (Fuel Poverty Statistics, Department of Energy and Climate Change, UK Government, 
September 2013). 
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xxi See, for instance, Pastor, Morello-Frosch, and Sadd, 2006. 
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